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There have been very few studies of treatment refusal generally, or,
more specifically, of the effects of risk disclosure on subsequent treatment
decisions. Anecdotal reports document that at least some patients refuse
treatment because of fear of the therapy. However, in one of the
Commission’s observational studies, which was the first systematic attempt
to determine the frequency of treatment refusals and their causes and
outcomes, refusals were found to occur about once per 15-20 patient days.
As indicated earlier in this Chapter, most involved minor treatments, not
life-threatening procedures. And, perhaps most importantly, the trigger for
refusing treatment was not too much but too little information. Patients who
refused treatments typically did so because the nature, purpose, and
attendant risks of the procedures had not been adequately explained. 
 
The Relationship of Ethical and Legal Standards 
 
From all that has been said, it is clear that the disclosure and
communication processes should be geared to the needs of particular
patients in given health situations. Professionals should seek to elicit the
individual’s goals and values and to frame the discussion in those terms,
with due regard to the patient’s emotional needs and intellectual capacities.
To what extent can or should the law aid movement in this direction? 
The Development of Legal Rules. To date, no American jurisdiction
has adopted legal requirements for informed consent fully congruent with
the ethical objectives set forth in this Report.60 The reasons for this are
partly historical: in most jurisdictions, failure to obtain informed consent is
treated as a form of medical negligence or malpractice. To assess whether a
particular act or omission constitutes malpractice, the legal system usually
relies on professional standards of practice. Thus, in a lawsuit alleging lack
of informed consent, the behavior of the defendant has traditionally been
assessed in light of the “professional standard” of disclosure—that is, what
other physicians would have disclosed in like circumstances. 
The law’s treatment of informed consent claims as a kind of medical
negligence and the resulting adoption of the professional standard of
disclosure tacitly assume that full disclosure is a recognized part of accepted
medical practice, and that departures from it label the practitioner as failing
to live up to the professional standard. This assumption has been
extensively criticized by scholars.61 Although both disclosure 
60 See generally Katz, supra note 1. 
61 See, e.g., Capron, supra note 36, at 407-10; Katz, supra note 1, at 154-60. 
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and consent have long been advocated and practiced by some,62 medical 
practice did not join the dual obligations of disclosure and consent in the 
sense of “informing for decision” until very recently. Thus reliance on a 
professional standard of disclosure is unlikely to provide much legal 
encouragement for the ideal of effective patient participation in 
decisionmaking set forth in this Report. Nevertheless, to the degree that 
professional attitudes and standards change over time in the direction of 
greater respect for, and encouragement of, patient participation in 
decisionmaking, the use of a professional standard will conform more 
closely with the objectives set forth in this Report. 
Since 1970, a number of American jurisdictions have abandoned use 
of the professional standard and moved at least part of the way toward a 
legal standard oriented more to the needs of the particular patient. With 
some variation in specifics, these courts have stressed that the standard of 
disclosure is properly set by society rather than by the medical profession, 
and they have adopted a standard that responds to the informational needs 
of the hypothetical “reasonable patient.” 
The Commission finds this approach commendable in recognizing that 
the appropriate standard is societal rather than professional and in 
redirecting the inquiry toward the needs of the patient. However, a standard 
based only on the needs of a reasonable patient offers no assurance that 
either the well-being or the self-determination of a particular patient will be 
advanced by the workings of the law. 
Numerous commentators have urged that the law of informed consent 
take the next step, moving beyond the reasonable patient standard to one 
that is more attentive to the informational needs of particular patients.63 The 
critical issue in this debate concerns the degree to which providers should 
be legally required to take into account the informational needs of particular 
patients that differ from those of the “reasonable patient.” Some 
commentators focus on apparent differences; others call upon practitioners 
to press their patients for a clearer articulation of their individual goals, 
values, and informational needs, which would then set an individual 
standard for disclosure. Such an evolution in legal requirements would 
move the law into closer conformity with the moral obligations of health 
care professionals that are set forth in this Report. 
62 Martin S. Pernick, The Patient’s Role in Medical Decisionmaking: A Social 
History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy (1981), Appendix E, in Volume 
Three of this Report. 
63 See note 61 supra. 
64 There are some informed consent cases and statutes that can be read as suggesting 
a more individualized or subjective approach 
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No jurisdiction has yet clearly taken this step.64 Indeed, in a number 
of states where courts have adopted the reasonable patient standard,
legislatures have reimposed the professional standard by statute.65 Their 
hesitancy to bring legal standards into closer conformity with moral
obligations is in part practical and in part political. 
Much of the difficulty arises from the fact that moral obligations
define a standard of conduct for individuals while legal requirements must
also be enforceable. Enforcement typically occurs via litigation conducted
long after injuries have occurred, on the basis of evidence that may include
selective and self-serving assertions by parties with a considerable stake in 
the outcome. Such a situation makes reliable determinations of the
individual parties’ wishes, needs, and intentions regarding the original
communication very difficult, which helps explain the law’s decided
preference for more objective standards, even at the cost of some injustice
in particular cases.66 Thus there must be some balance between the ethical
objectives the law seeks to encourage and the technical demands of a
workable litigation process. The Commission recognizes that further 
evolution of legal standards toward a firmer protection of individual self-
determination in medical decisions must be tempered by a recognition of
the law’s limits as an instrument of social control.67
Attitudes toward the Law. In the Commission’s survey, several 
questions to physicians and the public dealt with the legal doctrine of
informed consent. The majority of both groups agreed that patients’ rights
to information should be protected by law (see Figure 3). However,
significantly more physicians than patients agreed with the statement “Time
spent discussing diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment could be better spent
taking care of patients.” The public was more likely than physicians to think
that the legal requirements for obtaining 
toward determining what must be disclosed to patients, though no court has ever 
expressly held that a health care professional must disclose what the particular 
patient would have wanted to know. A similar issue exists with respect to the test of 
causation to be employed. Although courts have not only hinted but actually decided 
that whether or not the failure to disclose “caused” the patient’s injury is to be 
determined by reference to whether or not a “reasonable” person would have refused 
the treatment had he or she been properly informed, a few cases and statutes have 
begun to reject this formulation, focusing instead on whether the particular patient 
would have refused treatment had disclosure been proper. 
65 See Alan Meisel and Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 
An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 423-26 (1980). 
66 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C.Cir. 1972). 
67 See Chapter Seven infra for a further discussion of possible legal developments. 
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informed consent were clear and explicit (52% versus 32%), and doctors
were more likely than the public to feel that the requirements put too much
emphasis on disclosure of remote risks (73% versus 44%). 
Finally, both groups were asked which disclosure standard was best
(see Figure 4). More than 40% of the physicians and the public thought that
a standard based on the informational needs of a particular patient was
preferable to a reasonable patient or physician standard. 
Physicians were then asked whether they knew which standard applied
in the state(s) in which they practiced. Only 23% said they did. Surgeons
were more likely than any other specialty to say they knew (30%), and older
doctors were more likely than younger ones to claim knowledge of their
state’s standard (27% versus 17%). Overall, of the 23% who claimed to
know the standard, 54% of those practicing in states that have a standard
gave the correct answer. 
The Use of Consent Forms. Consent forms, which were originally
intended as documentation of disclosure and con- 
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sent, have in many cases come to substitute for the very processes they are
intended to substantiate.68 Furthermore, there appears to be substantial
variation among health care professionals about when consent forms are
required69 deriving in many cases from institutional differences in
interpretation of the law. And the law is, in fact, often unclear and
nonspecific about the requirements for consent. 
Several different consent forms are in use. Hospitals often require
patients upon admission to sign a blanket consent that purports to give
physicians authority to “treat as necessary.” The Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals requires, that separate consent forms be signed
for any procedure or treatment “for which it is appropriate” and that these
forms be included in the medical record.70 It appears from one of the
observational studies conducted for the President’s Commission that
physicians deem “procedures”—in contrast to “routine care”—as
appropriate for written consent. Procedures are 
68 See, e.g., Bradford H. Gray, Complexities of Informed Consent, 437 ANN.
AMER. ACAD. POLIT. SOC. SCI. 37 (1978). 
69 “As a legal matter, consent forms are rarely required. Those state informed
consent statutes that deal with consent forms make them permissible, not mandatory.
Even the federal regulations governing the conduct of federally funded research do
not require consent forms in all instances.” Alan Meisel, More on Making Consent
Forms Readable, 4(1) IRB 9 (Jan. 1982). 
70 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS, Chicago, Ill. (1981) at 84-86. 
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done relatively infrequently and include most invasive measures, as well as 
major diagnostic tests that carry some risk. Risk itself, however, does not 
distinguish the procedures for which written consent is thought to be 
required; written consent is typically not obtained for medications, even 
when major and frequent risks attend their use.71
Preprinted “fill-in-the-blank” forms are used for many procedures, 
especially surgery. The emphasis in these forms is on obtaining permission 
rather than on giving information, for they state that the general categories 
of legally material information have previously been “fully explained.” 
Some forms are specially prepared, as in the case of the stress tests for 
cardiac patients observed in one of the Commission’s studies. Here the 
nature of the test and its attendant risks were substantially different than for 
invasive procedures, and the form provided the only information patients 
received unless they chose to initiate a discussion after reading it.72
In the Commission’s survey, physicians were asked whether they 
usually obtained consent—and if so, in what form—for a variety of 
procedures. The frequency with which consent was obtained varied 
significantly with the nature of the procedure; virtually all doctors reported 
getting consent for inpatient surgery, and about half those surveyed reported 
they did not get consent for prescriptions and blood tests (see Table 3). This 
finding was substantiated in the Commission’s two observational studies. 
States’ informed consent laws (with the single exception of Texas) do 
not delineate consent requirements on a procedure-by-procedure basis. Nor 
does the law on informed consent generally distinguish between oral and 
written consent in judging validity; that is, written consent is not required 
where oral consent has been given.73 Indeed, one state’s statute and the case 
law in three states explicitly hold that consent need not be in writing in 
order to be valid.74 However, a signed written consent form is likely to 
make legal proof of consent significantly easier, at least in the absence of 
other complicating factors. Physicians’ consent practices apparently reflect 
this assumption. 
Physicians and the public were asked whether they agreed with several 
statements regarding consent forms (see Figure 5). 
71 Charles W. Lidz and Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of 
Medical Care (1982), Appendix C, in Volume Two of this Report, at section 4. 
72 Id. 
73 Hernandez v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (D. Kan. 1979); 
Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954). 
74 Meisel and Kabnick, supra note 65, at 468. See State-by-State Analysis of 
Informed Consent Laws (1982), Appendix L, in Volume Three of this Report. 
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75 Asking a person to sign a consent form may cause that person to refuse to sign
even when he or she would be willing to give oral consent. Cf. Eleanor Singer,
Informed Consent: Consequences for Response Rate and Response Quality in Social
Survey, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 144, 151 (1978). 
Nearly four-fifths of the public and 55% of the physicians think the primary
purpose of consent forms is to protect physicians from law suits.75 This 
finding seems to reflect more the advice of lawyers who represent health
care professionals than the ethical basis of informed consent, in which the
role of the consent form is to protect patients by ensuring that they have full 
information and are participating voluntarily. The majority of physicians
(64%) and the public (65%) think that consent forms help doctor-patient 
communications. Concerning written consent forms, 62% of the physicians
and 86% of the public think that a patient’s signature establishes that the 
individual has given consent. 
Of the 24 states with statutes on informed consent, only 13 make some
attempt to define the legal effect of a signed consent form. As noted above,
a signed form will always be some evidence that the patient actually 
consented to the treatment, and a jury could use it, along with other
evidence, to support or rebut the existence of actual consent. However, the 
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type of rebuttal evidence and the circumstances under which it is allowed
vary.76
In addition, information that must be included in the consent form in
order for it to be have legal weight varies by state. In Georgia, for example,
the form need not disclose any risks of the proposed procedure; only the
general nature of the treatment need be set forth.77 Louisiana, on the other
hand, 
76 In some states plaintiffs are allowed to prove they did not understand the
standardized consent form they signed. For example, one court stated that “the effect
to be given to a standard consent form is governed by the same principles used in
evaluating appellant’s claim under the informed consent doctrine. Thus, unless a
person has been adequately apprised of the material risks and therapeutic
alternatives incident to a proposed treatment, any consent given, be it oral or written,
is necessarily ineffectua1.” Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 n.3 (Md. 1977). In
that case, a signed form is subject to the same type of rebuttal as would be directed
against testimony that oral consent had been given. Other states restrict the type of
evidence that may be presented to rebut a signed written consent form. Some allow
only strict legal proof of fraud or misrepresentation. In one case, for example, the
plaintiff proved that she had not read the consent form that she had signed, but since
she presented no legal excuse for not reading the form, she was held to be bound by
its terms. Winfrey v. Citizens & Southern Nat’l Bank, 149 Ga. App. 488, 254 S.E.2d
725, 726 (1979). 
77 Winfrey v. Citizens & Southern Nat’l Bank, 149 Ga. App. 488, 254 S.E.2d 725,
726 (1979). 
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requires the form to list the frequency with which a specified set of risks
occurs for the particular procedure involved.78
In the Commission’s survey, 24% of the public reported that they had
signed a consent form in the last year. Among those people, 71% thought
their doctor explained the form satisfactorily and 29% said the explanation
was unsatisfactory. Those in poor health were the most satisfied (92%) and
those reporting their health status as fair were the least satisfied (60%). The
explanation of such a substantial difference between these two groups
(when it would seem more likely that the largest difference would be
between those in excellent and those in poor health) is not clear.79
When the people who had signed a consent form within the last year
were asked “After reading the consent form, did you feel that you fully
understood the risks of the treatment you were going to undergo?,” 72%
said “yes,” although this varied by subgroups just as the satisfaction with
the explanation did. Finally, these people were asked: “Have you ever
refused treatment because of what you learned about the treatment from the
written consent form?” Only 5% said they had.80
78 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.40(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
79 Those surveyed who had no usual source of medical care, the middle-aged (35-50 
years old), and those with less than a high school education were all less likely than 
people who had a usual source of care, the young, the old, and the better educated to 
view the explanation of the consent form as satisfactory. 
80 Women were more likely than men to have refused treatment because of what 
they learned from a consent form (7% versus 3%) and those without any health 
insurance were the most likely (12%) to have refused treatment on this basis. 
Refusers were likely to be young, college-educated, in fair or poor health, and people 
who receive care in a doctor’s office. 
There is strong evidence that existing consent forms are written in extremely 
turgid prose and that patients have a great deal of difficulty understanding them, 
even if they do not admit it. A study conducted for the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects found that “overall, no more than 15 percent of the 
consent forms were in language as simple as is found, for example, in Time 
Magazine. In more than three-fourths of the consent forms, fewer than 10 percent of 
the technical or medical terms were explained in lay language….” U.S. Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, Protection of Human Subjects—Institutional 
Review Boards: Report and Recommendations of the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 
56,174, 56,189 (1978). See also G.R. Morrow, How Readable Are Subject Consent 
Forms?, 244 J.A.M.A. 56 (1980); T.M. Grundner, On the Readability of Surgical 
Consent Forms, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 900 (1980). 
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Physicians were asked in an open-ended question what the effect of 
consent forms had been: 52% thought they had a positive effect (for 
example, that they improved patient awareness so patients knew more about 
their treatment and risks and asked more and better questions, encouraged 
more communication between doctors and patients, and provided legal 
protection for doctors and hospitals); 23% felt that consent forms had a 
negative effect (for example, that they increase patients’ fears, reduced 
compliance, caused patients to avoid necessary treatment, made patients 
distrust their doctors, increased law suits, and provided no legal protection); 
18% thought that informed consent forms had no effect; and 7% were not 
sure whether they had an effect or not. 
The Commission’s observational studies suggest that consent forms are 
typically read and signed after a decision has been made regarding 
treatment.81 This is probably as it should be, assuming that the form is 
presented for signature after discussion and that the patient has participated 
in making the decision. In the Commission’s view, consent forms should 
summarize discussion, but not be a substitute for it. Ideally, they will 
stimulate additional questions and discussion, as some physicians in the 
survey indicated, but they should not be allowed to replace such 
communication or to cut it off prematurely. 
81 More often than not, however, discussion prior to consent form signing was 
nonexistent or brief. See Lidz and Meisel, supra note 71; Paul S. Appelbaum and 
Loren H. Roth, Treatment Refusal in Medical Hospitals (1982), Appendix D, in 
Volume Two of this Report. 
 
